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We are interested in the macroeconomic implications of the separation of ownership and 
control. An alternative decentralized interpretation of the stochastic growth model is 
proposed, one where shareholders hire a self-interested manager who is in charge of the 
firm’s hiring and investment decisions. Delegation is seen to give rise to a generic conflict of 
interests between shareholders and managers. This conflict fundamentally results from the 
different income base of the two types of agents, once aggregate market clearing conditions 
are taken into account. An optimal contract exists resulting in an observational equivalence 
between the delegated management economy and the standard representative agent business 
cycle model. The optimal contract has two components: an incentive component that must be 
proportional to free-cash-flow and a variable 'salary' component indexed to the aggregate 
wage bill. The incentive component is akin to a non-tradable equity position in the firm. In 
our context it is not sufficient to resolve the 'micro' level agency issues raised by delegation. 
Failure to properly index the 'salary' component of the manager's may result in severe 
distortions in the investment policy of the firm and significant macroeconomic consequences. 
Specifically if the 'salary' component is fixed the manager adopts an excessively passive 
investment policy resulting in a very smooth economy. If on the other hand the 'salary' 
component of the manager's remuneration is pro-cyclical and more volatile than in the 
optimal contract the reactivity of investment to the productivity shocks is exacerbated and the 
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1.   Introduction 
 
Standard dynamic macroeconomics has avoided issues raised by the separation 
of ownership and control. It implicitly assumes either that there is no such separation 
or, alternatively, that all problems arising from it are entirely resolved either by a 
complete monitoring of managers’ decisions or via employment contracts that 
perfectly align the interest of the managers with those of the firm owners. As a result 
the crucial intertemporal decisions (and pricing) are all in accord with the 
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of the representative shareholder-worker-
consumer. 
In the present paper we question the abstraction behind the standard 
framework. In reality, separation of ownership and control is the rule, at least for the 
all-important publicly traded companies, and it is all too clear that the degree of 
monitoring exercised by shareholders can be very loose. For the IMRS of the 
shareholder-worker-consumer to be represented, let alone predominant in the day-to-
day operations of the firm, a contracting framework must be put in place which results 
in aligning the interests of managers and shareholders. We delineate the 
characteristics of such a contract and detail the macroeconomic implications of 
deviating from it.  
In the micro literature, incentive issues can take a variety of forms, e.g., 
shirking of effort, empire building, and/or the pursuit of private benefits. In this paper 
we observe that, in a macro general equilibrium context with delegated management, 
a generic conflict of interests may arise between shareholders and managers as a result 
of the priority payments made to workers in modern labor markets; i.e., of what the  2
traditional business literature has termed operating leverage
1. It implies that the IMRS 
of managers and of firm owners tend to differ in equilibrium, and that while the 
former is relevant for the determination of the firm’s investment policy, the latter is at 
the heart of asset pricing. If this divergence cannot be eliminated by appropriate 
contracting, self-interested managers will make intertemporal decisions that will not 
be those favored by shareholders. Imperfect control thus implies that the dynamics at 
the heart of the standard business cycle model based on the representative agent IMRS 
will be invalidated
2.  
In this paper we illustrate this conflict, delineate the optimal contract and 
explore the implications of deviating from it for the dynamic properties of the one 
good stochastic growth model. This model was originally conceived as a summary of 
the problem faced by a benevolent macroeconomic central planner.  Not until the 
seminal work of Brock (1982) and Prescott and Mehra (1980) did the model become 
eligible for use as a vehicle for analyzing data from actual competitive economies.  
These authors provided a decentralization scheme; that is, a formulation of the model 
under which its optimal allocations can be interpreted as the market allocations of a 
competitive economy in recursive equilibrium. 
  The models of Brock (1982) and Prescott and Mehra (1980) share a number of 
essential features: both interpretations postulate infinitely lived consumer-worker-
investors who rent capital and labor to a succession of identical one period firms. It is 
these consumer-worker-investors who undertake the economy’s intertemporal 
investment decision.  Subsequent, more realistic interpretations admit an infinitely 
lived firm which undertakes the investment decision usually under the added 
                                                 
1 In Danthine and Donaldson (2002a) we explore another implication of operating leverage taking the 
hypothesis of limited stock market participation by workers as a starting point. See also Guvenen 
(2003). 
2 This criticism also applies to less standard representative agent models such as those in the younger 
New Neo-classical Synthesis tradition.  3
assumption either than the firm issues and maximizes the value of a complete set of 
state claims, or that it issues and maximizes the value of a single equity share while 
otherwise being supplied with the representative shareholder’s marginal rates of 
substitution (see Danthine and Donaldson (2002b) for an elaboration).  Here, we relax 
the complete market hypothesis and discuss the extent to which the stochastic growth 
model can be viewed as describing the time series properties of a decentralized 
economy in which firms’ management is delegated to “firm managers” who cannot be 
perfectly monitored by firm owners
3.  
An outline of the paper is as follows:  Section 2 proposes the framework of our 
inquiry and discusses a number of modeling options. Section 3 focuses on the sources 
of  conflict between firm owners and the manager thereby setting the stage for the 
identification of an optimal contract in Section 4. The optimal contract requires not 
only endowing the manager with a non-tradeable equity share of the firm but also 
ensuring that the time series properties of the manager's stochastic discount factor and 
thus his consumption are identical to those of the firm owners. This latter condition in 
turn requires that the manager's remuneration also include a time-varying salary-like 
component whose properties are indexed on those of the aggregate wage bill. Section 
5 looks at the consequences of deviating from the optimal contract. It highlights the 
strength of the generic conflict of interest that exists between managers and 
shareholders and various alternative ways to resolve it. Section 6 generalizes the set-
up to a world with multiple firms while Section 8 concludes the paper. 
2.     The framework and modeling issues 
For ease of exposition we start with the assumption that the entire economy’s 
output is produced by a single perfectly competitive firm, a stand-in for a continuum 
                                                 
3  Another extension in the same spirit is provided by Shorish and Spear (1996) who propose an agency 
theoretic extension of the Lucas (1978) asset pricing model.  4
of identical competitive firms. Section 6 discusses the extension to many firms. There 
is a continuum of identical agents, a subset of which – of measure µ - was selected at 
the beginning of time to manage the firm. We view these managers as acting 
collegially and thus refer to them collectively as "the manager".
4  The rest act as 
workers and shareholders. The manager is self-interested and he is assumed to make 
all the relevant decisions in view of maximizing his own intertemporal utility.  
The main motive for delegation is, realistically, to relieve shareholders of the 
day-to-day operation of the firm and the information requirements it entails. This 
means that shareholders delegate to the manager the hiring and investment decisions 
and all that goes with them (human resource management, project evaluation, etc..) 
but that, as a by-product, they lose the informational base upon which  to evaluate and 
monitor the manager’s performance and to write complete contracts with him. Here 
we portray shareholders as detached firm owners, keeping informed of the main 
results of the firm’s activities but not of the “details” of its operations such as the 
current level of, and future perspectives on, total factor productivity (which is 
stochastic), its capital stock level, and the level of the investment expenses decided by 
the manager. In particular, they lack sufficient information to compute optimal 
employment and investment levels and to issue contracts that would deter the 
manager from deviating from their preferred decisions.
5 
The manager could, in principle, use his informational advantage for several 
purposes.  One particular hypothesis, emphasized in the corporate finance literature, 
asserts that managers are empire builders (Jensen, 1986) who tend to over-invest and 
                                                 
4  Nothing would be lost with making the assumption of a single manager (of measure zero) managing 
the firm and we will adopt it  later on, particularly when our goal is to compare the delegated 
management economy with the standard representative agent business cycle model. Our approach is 
meant to make clear where the measure zero assumption turns out to matter.  
5  Importantly managers' superior information would make Arrow-Debreu markets non viable. We are 
in a world where assuming the manager should maximize Arrow-Debreu profits is not an option.  5
possibly over-hire rather than return cash to shareholders. Philippon (2003) and Dow, 
Gorton and Krishnamurthy (2003) explore some of the general equilibrium 
implications of this hypothesis in related contexts. By contrast, we purposefully 
refrain from postulating “external” conflicts of interests. Our managers have standard 
preferences defined over consumption and their innate risk tolerance is identical to 
that of the shareholders. We rather concentrate on those conflicts that could arise 
endogenously as a result of the fact that, by the very nature of delegation, the 
manager’s marginal risk preferences may differ from those of shareholders or, for that 
matter, those of the representative agent of the standard stochastic growth paradigm.  
Telling a simple and consistent story requires resolving the following two 
modeling issues. First and least importantly, we assume that managers are not paid an 
hourly wage and that consequently the labor-leisure trade-off becomes irrelevant for 
them the day they accept a managerial position
6.  
The second and more difficult problem is the issue of the managers’ outside 
income. Outside income influences the marginal attitude toward risk and is relevant in 
the contracting problem between shareholders and managers as will be obvious from 
what follows. Clearly, the spirit of our analysis is one of incomplete risk exchange 
opportunities between the manager and the shareholders. And it is one where 
managers cannot use the financial markets to “undo” the characteristics of their 
incentive remuneration. We naturally assume that the manager cannot trade stocks. 
This is realistic in the sense that managers have their income disproportionately tied 
up with the fortunes of the company for which they work, without the possibility of 
taking equi-proportionate positions in the aggregate market. In particular, managers 
typically face restrictions in their ability to take (short) positions in the stock of their 
                                                 
6  This is a minor point in the sense that the optimal contract would lead to a first best labor supply 
decision on the part of the manager.  6
own firm or to adjust their long positions at specific times. This hypothesis also 
substitutes for the more difficult assumption that the investments of the firms are not 
spanned by existing assets, an assumption that is necessary to open up the possibility 
of disagreement among agents in this economy.  
It is more controversial (although customary in the partial equilibrium 
contracting literature) to assume that the manager is also prevented from taking a 
position in the risk free asset.  The size of the potential conflict of interests uncovered 
in this paper, however, implies that were risk-free borrowing and lending the only 
mechanism bringing the IMRS of the two agent types closer together, unplausibly 
large trades (relative to the manager’s consumption level) between the manager and 
shareholders would be necessary to resolve the conflicts. For this reason we find it 
more revealing to detail the potential of simple contracting to resolve the conflict 
without the help of the risk free asset market. Note that these restrictions are part and 
parcel of the optimal contract detailed in Section 4. And since the optimal contract 
attains the first-best there are no welfare consequences attached to them.  
Besides choosing their optimal consumption and portfolio investment streams, 
worker-shareholders are in charge of defining the form of the manager’s 
compensation function, g
m(.). Managers are offered renewable one-period contracts 
limiting to the maximum the shareholders’ need to collect reliable accounting 
information on the performance of the firm. In line with much of the contracting 
literature, we assume that the base contract is made of two parts, a fixed (“salary”) 
component that is potentially time-varying but is not dependent on variables 
influenced by the manager's decisions, and an incentive component that is a (linear or 
non-linear) function of some measure of the firm’s performance. The latter is clearly 
affected by the manager’s decisions. In general terms,   7
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where At represents the manager’s salary and xt an appropriate measure of the firm's 
performance, a function of the manager's actions 
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In problem (1)  the manager’s (homogeneous) period utility function is 
denoted u(  );  β is his discount factor, E is the expectations operator (we assume 
rational expectations). The manager’s decision variables are it, the amount of the 
current output invested at date t, and 
f
t n , the level of employment. The date t state 
variable vector contains kt, the beginning of period t capital stock and λt the current 
productivity level; (At,λt ) follows a Markov process whose characteristics are 
summarized in the transition density function F. The expression 
ff 1
ttt t t t f(.) f(k ,n ) k (n )
α− α =λ ≡ λ  is the aggregate production function, wt , the market 
determined wage payment, dt , the dividend or free-cash-flow, µg
m , the aggregate 
contractual payment to the managers and Ω is the constant depreciation rate of 
physical capital.
7 There is no dividend smoothing in our model and the dividend and 
free cash flow are thus identical; we use the terms interchangeably. 
                                                 
7 Nothing would change materially if we included a fixed amount of managerial input as an additional 
productive factor with the overall production function being constant returns to scale. This would make  8
The form of the representative shareholder-worker’s problem is standard 
although we want to be specific as to the content of his/her information set. We do not 
assume shareholder-workers are aware of the aggregate state variables (kt,λt) per se. 
We rather view them as statisticians able to correctly infer the transition probability 
functions of the variables that they take as market or firm determined: wt, qt (the 
equilibrium share price) and dt.
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. ) is the consumer-worker-investor’s (homogeneous) period utility of 
consumption, H(. )  his utility for leisure; 
s
t c  his period t consumption, 
s
t n  his period t 
labor supply, zt the fraction of the single equity share held by the agent in period t, 
and G(.) describes the transition probabilities for the indicated variables. The period 
utility function is purposefully assumed to be separable in consumption and leisure to 
permit comparison with a set-up where the relevant intertemporal decision is made by 
an agent whose utility for leisure is not specified.  
3.   The sources of conflict of interests 
Problem (2) has the following recursive representation 
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ss
ttt t tt t t t t t 1
z, n
ss
t t 1t 1t 1 t 1 t 1t 1 t 1tt t
V( z, d, q, w) m a x{ u ( z( q d) wn qz )
H(1 n ) V (z ,d ,q ,w )dG(d ,q ,w ;d ,q ,w )}
+
+




                                                                                                                                            
comparisons with the standard business cycle model more difficult, however. In the present version of 
the model, if the manager is not of measure zero, his remuneration decreases the return to stock 
holding. 
8 They can be viewed as the shareholders of a Lucas-tree economy: the firm is a fruit-producing tree. 
They observe the net output after the labor necessary to shake the trees has been paid and the fruits 
composted for fertilizing purposes have been set aside.  9
  
whose solution is characterized by the following relationships:       
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  Note from (3) that the  worker-shareholder (static)labor supply decision is 
independent on the probability distribution summarizing their information. From (4), 
the non-explosive equilibrium ex-dividend stock price takes the form: 
(5)    
s
1t j Gj














G refers to the expectations operator based on the information contained in the 
probability transition function G. From (4) or (5) it is clear that the pricing kernel 
relevant for security pricing is the shareholders’ IMRS.  
Under appropriate conditions, the manager’s problem has recursive 
representation: 
(6) 
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10 
The necessary and sufficient first order conditions to problem (6) can be written 
(7)  ()
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9  It follows from Blackwell’s (1965) Theorem and the results in Benveniste and Scheinkman (1979) 
that a continuous, bounded V
s( ) exists and has a unique solution characterized by (3) and (4) provided 
u( ) and H( ) are increasing, continuously differentiable and concave, and that dG( ) has the property 
that it is continuous and whenever h(d,q,w) is continuous,  h(d' ,q' ,w' )dG(d' ,q' ,w' ;d,q,w) ∫ is 
continuous as a function of (d,q,w). 
10  It again follows from Blackwell’s (1965) Theorem and the results in Benveniste and Scheinkman 
(1979) that a continuous, bounded V
m( ) exists that solves (6) provided u( ) and f( ) are increasing, 
continuous and bounded, and that g
m( ) is itself continuous and that dF(λ’;λ) is continuous with the 
property that for any continuous h(k’,λ’), h(k ', ')dF( '; ) λλ λ ∫ is also continuous in k and λ. In order for 
(7) and (8) to characterize the unique solution, the differentiability of u( ), g
m( ) and f( ) is required and 
u(g
m( )) must be concave.  10
(8)  ()
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where this latter representation is obtained using a standard application of the 
envelope theorem.  
  In equilibrium, at all dates t, 
(9)     
sf
ttt (1 )n n n −µ = = , and 
(10)      t z= 1  
(11) 
sm
tt t t t t t yf ( k , n ) ( 1) c ci ≡λ = − µ + µ + , 
At this stage, it is useful for the discussion to spell out the equations that 
characterize the equilibrium in the standard stochastic growth model where the central 
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and ct , nt, kt, and it have interpretations entirely consistent with problem (1), (2); e.g., 
ct denotes the consumption of the representative agent, it his period t investment, etc. 
In this economy, nt, it are fully characterized by, respectively, 
(13)  1t t 2ttt 1 t u( y i) f( k, n)    H( 1 n) , −λ = −  
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(15)  tt t t t t cif ( k , n ) y += λ ≡ . 
  11
Comparison of equations (13) with (3) and (7) make clear that for the standard 
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Similarly, for equation (14) to obtain from (8) it is necessary and sufficient 









Integrating these two conditions with respect to 
f
t n  and it, respectively, yields 
(up to a constant term): 
 
f
tt t t t t t t xf ( k , n ) w nid =λ − − ≡  
 
In other words if there is to be no first-order distortion, that would be manifest 
even in the steady state of this economy, the only appropriate measure of firm 
performance in our economy is free-cah-flow or dividend.  
The intuition for this result is clear. Absent strong extraneous sources of 
conflicts of interest, it is sensible, in order to align the interests of managers and 
shareholders, to endow the former with a non-tradeable equity position, hence to a 
claim to a fraction of present and future dividends. For the rest of the paper we adopt 
this identification which is also consistent with the minimal information requirement 
we may want to impose on worker- shareholders.  
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With the form of the leisure-labor trade-off unaffected by the delegation of 
management, the labor supply decision will be the same in the delegated management 
economy as in the standard model provided that the investment and capital stock  12
levels and the level of consumption of the representative worker-shareholder are all 
the same. The assumption that the manager is of measure zero is designed to 
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The same sort of assessment cannot be made for the dynamics of investment.  
Indeed, equation (14) can be written as 
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while, together with (11), equation (8) yields 
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Again equations (17) and (18) have a similar form and they yield the same steady state 
levels of investment and capital stock.  In this sense we can assert that with the 
proposed contract there are no “micro”- incentive issues. But, while equations (17) 
and (18) have a similar form, they effectively differ in that the relevant IMRS need 
not be the same. In (17) the argument in the utility function of the representative agent 
is, of necessity the result of market clearing restrictions and equal to output net of 
investment, i.e., to aggregate consumption. No such “discipline" is necessarily 
imposed in the case of the consumption of the manager in a delegated management 
economy.  In addition there is an additional distortion or “correction” to the 
manager’s IMRS in the case of a non-linear incentive contract. All this suggests that it  
is unlikely, except by design of his contract, that the manager’s consumption stream 
(or the representative manager’s for that matter) will possess the same time series 
properties as the representative shareholder’s. This is the source of a generic conflict 
of interests between the agent and the principal.   13
4.   Optimal contracting 
The preceding discussion has placed us in position to outline the 
characteristics of an optimal contract. We know that the incentive component of the 
contract should be based on dt , while the 'salary' component should be designed to 
achieve the equality 
 
mm
1t 1 1 t 1 1 t 1 t 1
mm
1t t 1t 1 t
u( g ( d ) )g ( d ) u( y i )
u( y i) u( g ( d) ) g ( d)





It is easy to see that these conditions are satisfied with a linear contract of the form 
m
ttt g( d ) A d =+ ψ , where the above condition, together with the homogeneity of the 
utility function, imposes 
  tt t t t t t Ad( y i ) ( w n d ) , t +ψ =ϕ − =ϕ + ∀ , for some 01 <ϕ  . 
This is satisfied for  
  tt t , and A w n ϕ=ψ =ϕ  
In other words, the link between the “fixed” salary component of the 
manager’s contract and the aggregate wage bill must be given by the power of the 
incentive component, that is, the fraction of free-cash-flow allocated to the manager. 
We thus obtain the following  
Theorem 4.1: A contract 
m
ttt g( d ) A d =+ ϕ  with  tt t Aw n =ϕ  is necessary and 
sufficient for a Pareto optimal allocation of labor and capital.  
 Proof: see the Appendix 
Theorem 4.1 has the immediate following corollary: 
Theorem 4.2 (Equivalence Theorem). Assume that the conditions of Theorem 
4.1 are satisfied and that in addition the manager is of measure µ = 0. Then under the 
linear contract 
m
ttt g( d ) A d =+ ϕ  with  tt t Aw n =ϕ , the delegated management  14
economy exhibits the same time series properties as, and is thus observationally 
equivalent to, the representative agent business cycle model. 
If we further assume a Cobb-Douglas production function: 
ff 1
tt t t f(k ,n ) k (n )
α− α = . Then, the optimal contract effectively stipulates tt A( 1 ) y =ϕ −α . 
It may thus be interpreted as one where the incentive element is linear in free cash 
flow and the fixed component is pro-cyclical with CORR(At, yt) = 1 and SD%(At) = 
t SD(y ). 
This result is important since it extends the realm of application of the 
standard business cycle model. The measure zero assumption is made for convenience 
only to facilitate comparison with the standard representative agent model.
11 With a 
positive measure of managers, it would be necessary to increase the productivity of 
factors to make up for the consumption of the manager in such a way that the 
consumption level of shareholder-workers, and consequently their labor supply 
decision, remain unchanged in equilibrium.  
In concluding this section it is worth stressing that the optimal contract must 
be understood as one where the incentive component depends on firm level 
performance as measured by free-cash-flow while the 'salary' component depends on 
the aggregate wage bill. In Section 6 we formalize this distinction in a more realistic 
economy with many firms each managed by a separate manager. 
5.  Consequences of deviating from the optimal contract     
In this section we illustrate the depth of the potential conflict of interests between 
managers and shareholders and the consequences of deviating from the optimal 
contract by discussing the properties of an economy where the manager is offered a 
                                                 
11  The measure zero assumption also eliminates any need to consider a possible participation constraint 
for the manager. There is no issue to make the manager at least as well off being a manager as the 
typical worker-shareholder.  15
linear contract on free cash flow with a constant through time salary component. In 
other words the precise form of the contract is   
m
tt g( d ) A d =+ ϕ= 
ss
t (1 )y d ϕ− α + ϕ. We show that the performance of the model 
deteriorates strikingly. Understanding why leads us to examine the case where  
m
t g( d ) =M
ss
t (1 )y d ϕ− α + ϕ; that is, where the 'salary' component is fixed but 
takes a more than proportional importance in the remuneration of the manager.  
We then discuss the potential of convex contracts for alleviating the investment 
distortions induced by a constant through time salary component.  
5.1.  A constant salary component 
If the 'salary' component of the manager's remuneration is constant, the manager's 
IMRS essentially shares the time series properties of free cash flows or dividends, 
rather than those of aggregate consumption. This may be expected to have an impact 
on the investment decision and consequently on the dynamics of the economy for at 
least two reasons. First, operating leverage, that is, the quantitatively large priority 
payment to wage earners, makes the residual free cash flow a more volatile variable 
than aggregate consumption. In the standard Hansen (1985) RBC model the non-
filtered quarterly standard deviation of the former is about 14% vs. 3.3% for the latter.  
This in turn implies that, ceteris paribus, the manager will tend to be excessively 
prudent in his investment decisions. Second, in the same model the free cash flow is a 
countercyclical variable. This results almost mechanically from calibrating properly 
the relative size of investment expenses, of the wage bill, and generating an aggregate 
investment series that is significantly more variable than output
12. But this can be 
expected to have an important impact on investment. Indeed, in the standard RBC 
model, a positive productivity shock has both a push and a pull effect on investment. 
                                                 
12 With dt = yt – wtnt – it = αyt - it and α = .36, if investment is about 20% of output on average, an 
investment series that is twice as volatile as output will make dt countercyclical.    16
On the one hand, shock persistence implies that the return to investment between 
today and tomorrow is expected to be unusually high. This is the pull effect. On the 
other hand, the high current productivity implies that output and consumption are 
relatively high today. The latter signifies that the cost of a marginal consumption 
sacrifice is small. This is the push effect. While the pull effect is unchanged in the 
delegated management model, the push effect would be absent, or even negative if the 
free cash flow variable were to remain countercyclical. This should make for a much 
weaker reaction of investment to a positive productivity shock. 
Another way to express this is to note that as a rational risk averse individual, the 
manager wants to increase his consumption upon learning of a positive productivity 
shock realization since the latter is indicative of an increase in his permanent income. 
But, for the manager under the circumstances of this subsection, such a consumption 
increase necessitates an increase in dividends, which obtains only if the response of 
investment to the shock is moderate enough.   
Numerical simulation confirms this intuition and permits detailing some of its 
main implications. Table 1 reports the H-P filtered standard deviations of the main 
macroeconomic aggregates in the delegated management economy and compares 
them with those of the Hansen (1985) indivisible labor model. 
Table 1 : HP-Filtered Standard Deviations of  Main Macro Aggregates – 
Indivisible Labor vs. Delegated Management 
  Hansen indivisible labor  Delegated management economy 
  SD Relative  SD  SD Relative  SD 
y  1.80 1.00 1.14 1.00 
c  .52 .29 .82   .72 
i  5.74 3.19 2.11 1.85 
n 1.37  .76  .34  .30 
k  .49 .27 .18 .16 
Note: same parameters for both economies: u( ) = log( ); H(1-nt)= Bnt, B = 2.85; α = 
.36, Ω=.025,
2
t1 t t t ; .95, N(0; ); .00712 +ε ε λ= ρ λ + ε ρ = ε σσ =    ∼ ; ϕ = .01; y
ss = 1.14. 
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Figures 1 and 2 display the Impulse response function of both models
13. The 
mechanics underlying the delegated management model is seen to be profoundly 
altered. The starting point is the much more sober reaction of investment to the 
productivity shock yielding, as expected, a much smoother behavior for the 
investment series (Relative SD(i) is about one third of its value in the reference 
Hansen (1985) economy). The natural consequence of this fact is to make 
consumption absorb a larger proportion of the shock and be more variable (Relative 
SD(c) is multiplied by almost 3). This in turn means that the marginal utility of 
consumption is very responsive to the exogenous shock implying that the reaction of 
labor supply required to maintain the equality in (16) is smaller. That is, the reactivity 
of employment to the shock is significantly smaller, yielding a weaker propagation 
mechanism and a smoother output: SD(y) falls from 1.8 % to 1.14 %, and the standard 
deviation of the exogenous shock process must be increased by about 62% to restore 
the aggregate volatility of the economy to its observed level.
14 
This discussion underlines the fact that if the 'macro' conflict of interests, 
originating in the specific income position of the manager, is not attended to, 
profoundly different dynamics result from (18) as opposed to (17). The key (for 
macrodynamics) investment decision is, in a delegated management economy, in the 
hands of an agent, the manager, whose income stream (and thus marginal preferences) 
are inherently very different from those of the representative shareholder-worker.  
                                                 
13 These are the products of computing the dynamic equilibria of the model with the help of the 
algorithm provided by Harald Uhlig  
(http://www.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/wpol/html/toolkit/version4_1.html). 
14  These results stand in sharp contrast to the implications of models built upon the Jensen (1986) 
hypothesis that managers will invest all available free cash flow to build empires, a feature that tends to 
accentuate the volatility of investment, to enhance its procyclicity and to strengthen the propagation 
mechanism.  The Dow et al (2003) model, in particular, replicates quite well a limited set of business 
cycle stylized facts, and most especially the volatility of investment.  It is a model, however, in which 
the manager does not undertake an actual investment decision except in the most trivial sense.  In 
addition, the shareholder-owners are presumed to retain a detailed knowledge of the firm’s production 
process, a hypothesis we have, realistically we believe, proposed to relax.  18
Figure 1: Indivisible labor model IRF’s 
 
Figure 2: Delegated management model IRF’s 
 
 
In a sense these observations serve to underline the fact that in a general 
equilibrium principal-agent economy there may be a tension between the 'micro' 
necessity of aligning the interests of agent and principal - which we has led us to  19
define the incentive component of the manager's remuneration as a function of 
counter-cyclical free-cash-flow - and the 'macro' conflict of interests that results when 
the time series properties of the manager's consumption are not close to those of the 
(pro-cyclical) aggregate consumption.  
Is there a possibility of resolving the tension without resorting to the optimal 
contract? Increasing the size of the fixed component of the manager's remuneration 
may be an option. By doing so, we make the manager effectively less risk averse at 
the margin, or, in other words, more willing to substitute consumption across time. 
That is, he is prepared to accept a counter-cyclical consumption pattern consistent 
with the first best investment policy.  
This intuition is borne out in the results of Table 2 where we assume a log 
utility manager contractually entitled to 1% of free-cash-flow. In the baseline case of 
Table 1, he would thus also receive 1% of the steady state wage bill.
15 We then 
progressively increase the relative importance of the 'salary' component by setting M 
to 3,  and then 8 in the contract 
m
t g( d ) =M
ss
t (1 )y d ϕ− α + ϕ. We further illustrate the 
issue by also setting M=0, i.e., altogether dispensing with the fixed component of the 
contract. 
                                                 
15 The characteristics of the economy are absolutely identical when this number is 2% or ½ % instead 
of 1%, that is, if the two components of the managers’ income are increased or decreased 
simultaneously (while maintaining the assumption that they are approximately of measure zero).  20
Table 2: Delegated Management Economy: γ = 1 ; linear contracts; ϕ = .01; various M 
  Standard Deviations in %  Correlation with output 
M   0  1  3  8  IL*  0  1  3  8  IL* 
y  1.01 1.14 1.37  1.78  1.80 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
c
m  .13 .19 .20  .17    .26 -.87  -.89  -.89   
d .13 1.38  3.89 8.62   .26 -.87  -.89  -.89   
c
s  .88 .82 .74  .71  .52 1.00  .99 .94 .64 .87 
i  1.41 2.11 3.40  5.82  5.74 1.00 .99  .98  .96  .99 
k .13 .18 .28  .42  .49 .26 .36 .43 .50 .35 
n .14 .34 .72  1.43 1.37  .99 .96 .94 .93 .98 
w  .88 .82 .74  .71    1.00  .99 .94 .64  
r
k  .04 .04 .05  .06  .06 .99 .99 .98 .97 .96 
* Indivisible Labor economy with log utility; y
ss = 1.12. Other parameter values as in 
Table 2 
 
Table 2 confirms the role played by the natural counter-cyclicity of dividends. 
Without fixed remuneration (M=0) the manager decides on investment expenses 
compatible with his consumption being pro-cyclical. This leads to a very smooth 
behavior of investment.  The column M=1 replicates the data of Table 1. The time 
series properties of dividends and of the manager’s consumption are now somewhat 
dissociated. When M goes from 0 to 1, the variability of investment increases by 23% 
and dividends move from being positively correlated with output to a correlation with 
output of -.81. For M=3, the volatility of investment and output increases to 3.4% and  
1.37%, respectively. But for the economy's dynamics to approximate those of the 
indivisible labor model, one needs to increase the relative weight of the fixed 
component of the manager’s remuneration to 8 times the weight of the variable 
incentive component.  With this sort of contract, the manager is willing to accept a 
countercyclical consumption path and adopts an investment policy that is as 
responsive to productivity shocks as the representative agent of the indivisible labor 
model. 
We focus in this paper on the natural conflict of interests between shareholders 
and managers arising from market clearing conditions. In so doing we largely bypass  21
the other sources of conflicts of interests emphasized by the microeconomic literature 
and motivating incentive-based contracts. The results of this section suggest that the 
incentive component of managers’ remuneration may have to be toned down 
considerably in order to resolve the conflict of interests arising from macro 
considerations. In this sense they suggest the possibility of a conflict between the 
incentive compatibility conditions dictated by micro considerations and those arising 
from the adopted macro perspective.   
5.2  Effects of non linear one-period contracts  
Given the prevalent use of convex incentive contracts in managerial 
compensation, it is natural to check whether convexity can be viewed as an 
appropriate response to the manager's timidity in his investment decisions whenever 
the salary component of his remuneration does not have the appropriate cyclical 
properties. To this end, we relax the assumption of a linear g
m contract and explore 
the extent to which a non-linear one-period contract can help align the interests of 
firm owners and managers. It turns out the intuition can be made sharper when the 





tt g ( d) ( d ) ( d),
−θ θ =ϕ  
 
where d is the average free-cash-flow level when  1 θ= . The constant term is 
designed to insure that the average manager’s remuneration is little affected by 
changes in the curvature, θ , of the function; ϕ corresponds to the fraction of free-
cash-flows accruing to a representative manager. Our rationale for exploring the 
implications of such contracts is the presence of the first derivative of the 
remuneration function as the modifier to the IMRS of the manager in equation (18).  22










the marginal utility term in the RHS of (8) takes the form: 
 
mm 1 1( 1 ) 1
1t 1 t t v (g (d ))g (d ) [M(d) ] (d )
−θ −γ θ −γ − =θ   
and the effective IMRS of the manager becomes:   
(20) 
(1 ) 1 mm
mm 1 t1 1 t1 t1
mm
1t 1 t t
v (g (d ))g (d ) d
.







Expression (20) provides the basis for the following: 
 
 Theorem  5.1. Under contract (19), the manager’s effective risk aversion results 
from a combination of his subjective coefficient of risk aversion and the curvature of 
the contract. It is given by the expression: 1( 1) −θ −γ . 
In practice this result implies that an economy with γ = 3 and a linear contract 
(1( 1) −θ −γ =3) is observationally equivalent (except for the volatility of the 
manager’s consumption and its correlation with output) to one where γ = 2 and θ = 2 
or γ =4 and θ = 2/3, etc.  
It has the following corollary implications: 
Corollary 5.1.  If the manager has logarithmic utility (γ =1), then his investment 
decision cannot be influenced by the curvature of the remuneration contract.  
Corollary 5.2.  If the manager is less risk averse than the log ((1 ) −γ > 0), then a 
convex contract θ > 1 makes the manager’s effective rate of risk aversion smaller than 
his subjective rate of risk aversion, thus leading to a more aggressive investment 
policy.  For the FOC on investment to be necessary and sufficient, the effective 
measure of risk aversion must be larger than unity, however, requiring that θ be 
strictly smaller than 
1
1−γ
.   23
Corollary 5.3.  If the manager is more risk averse than the log, (1 ) −γ < 0 , then the 
larger θ, the more effectively risk averse the manager becomes.  
In this context if one wants the manager to behave more aggressively, that is, for 
his effective measure of risk aversion to be larger than his subjective rate of risk 
aversion, one would rather propose a concave contract (θ < 1)! Note that there is no 
way to make the manager effectively less risk averse than the log if his γ is larger than 
1, short of proposing a contract with θ < 0 ! For the exponent of the effective IMRS to 






This discussion suggests that, if an additional source of conflict between the 
manager and the shareholder is heterogeneity in their attitude toward risk, then that 
specific source of conflict can be resolved by appropriately (that is, with the right 
curvature θ) designing a short term contract of the form (19). This is true, however, 
only if the manager’s utility function is not logarithmic, and it ignore the effects of 
any potential fixed component of remuneration. 
The upshot of these results is that the only plausible case where a short run non-
linear contract is likely to have the desired effect is the case where the manager is less 
risk averse than the log and he is offered a convex contract. Table 3 displays the 




Table 3: Delegated Management Economy: γ
 = ½ ; convex contracts with no salary 
component, various θ 
  Standard Deviations in %  Correlation with output 
θ   1.5  1.9  1.95  1.96  IL*  1.5  1.9  1.95  1.96  IL* 
y  1.07 1.37 1.65  1.77  1.80 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
c
m  1.01 7.53 14.02 16.78   -.81 -.89 -.89 -.89  
d .67  3.96 7.19  8.56    -.81 -.89 -.89 -.89   24
c
s  .85 .73 .69  .70  .52 1.00  .94 .76 .65 .87 
i  1.73 3.43 5.09  5.79  5.74 1.00 .98  .97  .96  .99 
k .15 .28 .38  .42  .49 .32 .43 .48 .50 .35 
n .23 .73 1.21 1.42 1.37  .97 .94 .93 .93 .98 
w  .85 .73 .69  .70    1.00  .94 .76 .65  
r
k  .037  .047  .06  .06  .06 .99 .98 .97 .97 .96 
* Indivisible Labor economy with log utility; Other parameter values as in Table 2 
 
Table 3 shows that it is possible to get very close to the time series properties 
of the indivisible labor economy, but to obtain that result we have to make the 
manager effectively almost risk neutral.
16 With θ = 1.96 and γ = ½, the exponent of 
dividend growth in the IMRS is  (1 ) 1 .04 θ− γ −= − . Note that with these parameter 
values, the variability of manager’s consumption becomes quite extreme
17. Moreover 
the manager’s consumption then is highly countercyclical. Essentially what these 
results stress once again is the importance of operating leverage translating into 
naturally countercyclical free-cash-flows. The incentive dimension of the manager’s 
contract then has the natural property of inducing a countercyclical consumption path. 
To avoid this undesirable characteristic, a risk averse manager is led to moderate the 
response of investment to a favorable productivity shock. The more risk averse, that is 
the lower the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, the more pronounced is this 
effect.  On the contrary, if the manager is almost risk neutral or if his contract makes 
him effectively close to risk neutral relative to changes in dividends, then he becomes 
again freer to react to the pull effect on investment of a positive productivity shock.  
                                                 
16  Here we rely, without proof, on the intuition that similar time series are likely to be the outcome of 
equally similar investment policies.  Note that the capital stock process in the case of θ =1.96 of Table 
3 is  tt 1 t 8023 1674 k. k . − =+ λ , while it is  tt 1 t 7986 1706 k. k . − =+ λ in the m/θ = 1/1.054 case of 
Table 4. 
17 As an application of Theorem 5.1, let us observe that the same macroeconomic dynamics would be 
obtained in an economy where the manager’s risk aversion is γ =2 and the contract curvature is θ = -
.98. The only (important) difference is that with such a contract the manager’s consumption would turn 
pro-cyclical: ρ(y,c
m)=+.89 instead of -.89.  25
In Table 4 we check the possibility of combining the two dimensions 
discussed so far, a more than proportional fixed 'salary' component and a convex 
incentive component. First we observe again that if the manager is less risk averse 
than log (γ = ½), it is easier to have him adopt a pro-cyclical investment policy. This 
translates into the fact that a linear contract with M = 4  now assures an almost perfect 
match with the time series properties of the indivisible labor model.  
Alternatively, with a rate of risk aversion of γ = ½ it is possible to combine the 
effects of a convex contract with those of a remuneration with a fixed component. A 
very close match with the time series of the indivisible labor model is obtained with 
M =3 and a degree of contract curvature θ = 1.007, or with M= 2 and θ = 1.019 or 
even with M=1 and θ = 1.054.  
In the case of a less-risk-averse-than-log manager, a remuneration combining 
appropriately a fixed component with an incentive element that is a convex function 
of free cash flow thus appears as a powerful way for shareholders to resolve the 
conflict of interests in circumstances where the optimal contract cannot be offered. It 
is, however, one that requires a delicate calibration around the manager’s exact 








Table 4: Delegated Management Economy: γ = 1/2 ; convex contracts with a fixed 
salary component; various M and θ 
  Standard Deviations in %  Correlation with output 









y 1.79  1.79 1.79 1.79 1.80 1.00  1.00 1.00  1.00 1.00
c
m  .34  .46 .67 1.29   -.89  -.89  -.89  -.89   
d 8.75  8.88 8.85 8.79   -.89  -.89 -.89  -.89   26
c
s  .71  .71 .71 .70 .52  .63  .62 .63  .63 .87 
i 5.88  5.95 5.94 5.91 5.74 .96 .96  .96 .96  .99 
k  .42  .42 .43 .42 .49  .50  .50 .50  .50 .35 
n 1.44  1.47 1.46 1.45 1.37 .93 .93  .93 .93  .98 
w  .71  .71 .71 .70  .63  .62 .63  .63  
r
k  .06  .06 .06 .06 .06  .97  .97 .97  .97 .96 
* Indivisible Labor economy with log utility; Other parameter values as in Table 2 
 
5.3. What if the salary component is more variable than GDP? 
 
  As a final step with this set-up, we study the implications of a contract where 
the salary component is appropriately tied to the behavior of the aggregate wage bill 
but whose relative size in relation to the incentive component is larger than in the 
optimal contract.  
  The contract we study is 
m
tt t g( d ) M( 1 ) y d , =ϕ − α + ϕwhere  
M is a proportionality coefficient taking values 1.2 or 1.5. In this context the salary 
component has the right degree of cyclicity but it is more variable in percentage terms 
than what is prescribed in the optimal contract. The results for the case of a 
logarithmic manager are collected in Table 5 .  
  In conformity with the intuition developed thus far one observes that with a 
pro-cyclical 'salary' component that is more variable than the aggregate wage bill, or 
alternatively whose time-series properties overcome those of the (counter-cyclical) 
incentive component, the investment decision can become significantly more reactive 
to the productivity shock than in the standard indivisible labor model. As a result the 
amplification mechanism is increased and with the same shock size the economy 
becomes much more variable.  
 
Table 5 : Delegated Management Economy with variable salary component; 
     γ = 1 ; Various M 
  Standard deviation in %  Correlation with output 
M  1  1.2  1.5  IL*  1  1.2  1.5  IL* 
y  1.79 2.09 2.86  1.80 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00  27
c
m  .52  .64    .90      .87  .88  .87   
d 8.05 11.09  19.02     -.97  -.97 -.97  
c
s  .52   .47   .64  .52   .87  .64  -.18  .87 
i  5.74 7.37 11.62 5.74   .99  .99  .99   
k  .49   .63   .97  .49   .35  .37  .38  .35 
n  1.37 1.82 3.03  1.37   .98  .98  .98  .98 
w  .52   .47  .64     .87  .64  -.18   
r
k  .06   .07   .10  .06   .96  .96  .94  .96 
* Indivisible Labor economy with log utility 
Other parameter values as in Table 2 
 
  The lesson of this latter exercise is that if the non-incentive portion of the 
manager's remuneration is more variable than what is prescribed by the optimal 
contract, then separation of ownership and control may help rationalize observed 
macroeconomic fluctuations with a lower exogenous shock volatility than typically 
needed in the standard business cycle model.  
  6. Many firms 
  Our understanding of the interplay between the micro incentive issues and the 
potential macro conflict of interests between shareholders and managers justifies 
lifting the assumption of a single perfectly competitive firm. In this section we 
therefore explicitly model an economy with many firms, each of which is managed by 
a single manager of measure zero. The total measure of managers is µ. Each manager 
is offered a linear contract based on 
j
t d  as the measure of firm j's performance.  
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  Worker-shareholders are perfectly diversified. They collectively hold the 
market whose total value is measured by qt and are thus entitled to the aggregate 
dividend that we continue to identify as dt. In addition, to the extent that individual 
firms do not go bankrupt (we do not assume limited liability) and that there is a 
competitive aggregate labor market their income is not tied to the specific firm they 
work for (alternatively we could make the standard assumption that they share their 
working time across all firms). Under these assumptions, problem (2) still perfectly 
represents the problem of the representative worker-shareholder. 
  We use the same strategy as before to derive the optimal contract. That is, we 
derive the necessary and sufficient first-order conditions for a solution to the 
representative agent problem and then insure that these conditions are reproduced in 
the context of many firms with delegated management under the optimal contract.  
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  This problem yields the following first-order conditions: 
(23) 
jjj
1t t 2ttt 1 t u( y i) f( k, n)    H( 1 n) −λ = −  
(24) 
jjj
1t t 1t 1 t 1 1t 1t 1t 1 u (y i ) u (y i ) f (k ,n ) (1 ) dG(.,.) ++ + ++ ⎡⎤ −= β − λ+ − Ω ⎣⎦ ∫  
By contrast, in recursive form problem (21) can be written as 
                                                 
18  This central planning representation implicitly assumes that capital cannot be reallocated across 
firms once it has been installed. It is also implicit in the manager's problem (21).  29
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where we assume that dF(.)includes enough information to permit the manager j 's 
expectation of the future value of 
j λ  to be as precise as the expectation of the  
representative agent in (22). It includes as well the relevant information on the 
statistical process for
j
t A . 
  The FOC for this problem are as follows: 
  
jjj
2ttt t f( k, n)    w, λ=  which in conjunction with (3) yields (23) (provided the 
total measure of managers µ=0 and thus no consumption is "lost" for the shareholder-
worker). As to the investment decision, one obtains: 
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  In this paper we have shown that in the general equilibrium of an economy 
where shareholders delegate the management of the firm, the key decision maker, the 
manager, inherits an income position that inherently will lead him to make very 
different investment decisions than firm owners, or the representative agent of the  30
standard business cycle model, would make. The conflict of interests is endogenous, 
that is, it does not result from postulated behavioral properties of the manager; it is 
generic, that is, it characterizes the situation of the “average” manager as a necessary 
implication of market clearing conditions; and, it is severe in the sense that, if it is 
unmitigated by appropriate contracting or monitoring, it results in very different 
macro dynamics.  
  We derive the properties of an optimal contract.  This contract attains the first 
best and it results in an observational equivalence between the delegated management 
economy and the standard representative agent business cycle model.  
  The optimal contract has two components: an incentive component that must 
be proportional to free-cash-flow and a variable 'salary' component indexed to the 
aggregate wage bill. The incentive component is akin to a non-tradable equity position 
in the firm. In our context it is thus not sufficient to resolve the 'micro' level agency 
issues raised by delegation. Failure to properly index the 'salary' component of the 
manager's may result in severe distortions in the investment policy of the firm and 
significant macroeconomic consequences.  
  Specifically if the 'salary' component is fixed the manager adopts an 
excessively passive investment policy resulting in a very smooth economy. In order to 
align the interests of a manager so remunerated with those of firm owners, one must 
make him highly willing to substitute consumption across time. If this is the case, he 
will be prepared to sacrifice his consumption in good times (accepting to delay 
dividend payments to finance large investment expenses) and he will respond 
sufficiently vigorously to favorable investment opportunities.  
There are two ways to make the manager nearly risk neutral. The first is to 
offer him a non linear contract. Convex contracts are, however, no panacea. This is  31
true first because a logarithmic manager is insensitive to the curvature of the contract. 
Second, a less-risk-averse-than-log manager does respond to convex contracts. For the 
conflict of interests to be fully resolved, however, it appears that extreme fine-tuning 
of the curvature of the contract is necessary requiring a very precise knowledge (by 
the firm owners who issue the contract) of his rate of risk aversion (or of his 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution). Third, if he is more risk averse than log, there 
is no solution but to propose an unconventional remuneration that is inversely related 
to the firm’s results, paying high compensation when free cash flows are low and 
conversely.  
An alternative way to make the manager less risk averse at the margin, if his 
preferences are described by a CRRA utility function, is to propose a remuneration 
with a more than proportional fixed salary component in addition to the incentive-
based element. This approach appears to have a better chance of realigning the 
interest of all parties to the contract and of reproducing the dynamics of the standard 
RBC model without delegation. If the manager is too risk averse (log or higher than 
log), the macro-based conflict of interests, however, requires a considerable 
downplaying of the incentive component of the manager’s contract, a fact that could 
prove to be a serious constraint in environments where the more traditional external 
conflicts between agent and principal are at work.  
  On the other hand we show that if the 'salary' component of the manager's 
remuneration is pro-cyclical and more volatile than what is called for by the optimal 
contract the reactivity of investment to the productivity shocks is exacerbated and the 
amplification mechanism can be increased significantly.  
Reconciling the viewpoints of a manager with powers of delegation and of a 
representative firm owner is thus no trivial task. Yet, short of an optimal contract or of  32
perfect monitoring, that is, in situations where corporate governance problems 
between managers and shareholders are not adequately mediated, there is little chance 
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Proof of Theorem 4.1 
 
⇒ Suppose the contract is of the form 
m
ttt g( d ) A d =+ ϕ  
Since 
ff
tt t t t t t t t d f(k ,n ) w n i (A d ) =λ − − − µ + ϕ
ff
tt t t t t t t (1 )d f (k , n ) w n i A +µϕ = λ − − −µ  
(25) 
ff
tt t t t t t t
1
d[ f ( k , n ) w n i A ]
1
=λ − − − µ
+µϕ
. 




tt t t t t t t m
tt i, n
m
t t t1 t1 t
u{A [f(k ,n ) w n i A ]}
1 W( k , ) m a x
W[ ( 1 ) k i , ] d F ( ; ) ++
ϕ ⎧ ⎫ +λ − − − µ ⎪ ⎪ +µϕ λ= ⎨ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ +β −Ω + λ λ λ ⎩⎭ ∫
. 
They are 
(26)    
ff
1t t tt t t t t
m
1t t t 1 t 1 t
u{ A [ f( k,n) wn i A] }
11
W[ ( 1 ) k i , ] d F ( ; ) ++
⎛⎞ ϕϕ
+λ − − − µ ⎜⎟ +µϕ +µϕ ⎝⎠












1t t W( k , ) λ=  
ff
1t t tt t t t t u{ A [ f( k,n) wn i A] }
1
ϕ
+λ − − − µ
+µϕ
f






Thus (26) becomes  
(28)
ff
1t t tt t t t t
ff f
1 t1 t1 t1 t1 t1 t1 t1 t1 1 t1 t1 t1 t1 t
u{ A [ f( k,n) wn i A] }
1
u {A [f(k ,n ) w n i A ]}[f (k ,n ) (1 )])dF( ; )
1
++ + + + + + + + + + +
ϕ
+λ − − − µ =
+µϕ
ϕ
β+ λ − − − µ λ + − Ω λ λ
+µϕ ∫
 




1t t tt 1 t u( wn d) w H( 1 n ) += −  
In equilibrium  t z1 =  and 
fs
tt nn = ; thus (27) and (29) yield 
(30)  () 1t t t 2 t t t 1 t uw n df ( k , n ) H ( 1n ) +λ = −  
 
Substituting for the equilibrium value of  tt t Aw n =ϕ , equations (26) and (30) become 
  35
(31)    
f
1t t t t t t t t 1t t u{ wn [ f( k,n) wn i] } u{ ( y i) }
11 1
ϕϕ ϕ





1 t1 t1 1 t1 t1 t1 t1 t u ( (y i ))[f (k ,n ) (1 )]dF( ; )
1
++ + + + +
ϕ
β− λ + − Ω λ λ
+µϕ ∫  
and  
(32)  1t t 2 t t t 1 t
1





The homogeneity of u( ) implies that (31) can equivalently be written 
(33)  1t t u( y i) − = 1 t1 t1 1 t1 t1 t1 t1 t u( y i ) [ f( k , n ) ( 1 ) ] d F ( ; ) ++ + + + + β− λ + − Ω λ λ ∫ , or  
(34) 1t t
1




= 1 t1 t1 1 t1 t1 t1 t1 t
1
u[ ( y i ) ] [ f( k ,n ) ( 1 ) ] d F ( ; )
1
++ + + + + β− λ + − Ω λ λ
+µϕ ∫  
It is well known that (32) and (33) are the necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
solution to problem (12) if  0 µ= . Theorem 4.2 follows. If  0 µ≠ , then it is clear that 
the labor supply decision of the shareholder-worker resulting from condition (32) will 
not be identical to the one obtained in the RBC model; however, equations (32) and 
(34) together make clear the fact that the intertemporal marginal rates of substitution 
of the two agents are identical as required for Pareto optimality. The sufficiency part 
of Theorem 4.1 follows. 
 
<=  Suppose that the joint DM-CWI equilibrium investment and labor service 
functions are P.O. choices from the perspective of problem (12), and assume 
m
1t g( x ) 0 . >  
From the manager's problem (6), the necessary and sufficient first order condition 
with respect to labor is: 
 
mm t
1t 1 t f
t
x






In order for labor to be allocated optimally is must be that   
(35)      
f t
2tt t t f
t
x






Furthermore, since the manager chooses the optimal investment function from the 
perspective ot problem (12), it must be that 
(36)  ()
mm t
1t t 1t 1 t
t
x






for some L>0. 
Finally, in order for the optimal allocation of consumption to be P.O., we know from 
the Lemma below that 
(37) 
m
tt t g( x ) ( y i ) =ψ −  
for some  0 ψ> . 
Since u( ) is homogeneous, (36) and (37) imply 
t






u( y i) L u[ ( y i) ]
i
x


























Integrating (35) and (38), 
ff f
tt t t t t t t t t t t xx ( i , n ; k , ) f ( k , n ) w niB =λ = λ − − + , where Bt 
is unrelated to 
f
t n and it. 
 
Yet from (37), 
tt t xy i . =− Thus 
f
tt t t tt t yiyw niB −= − −+ , and 
f
tt t Bw n = . 
In equilibrium, 
f
tt nn = , thus  tt t Bw n = , and the contract is  
m








1t 1t v( c ) u( c) ,  o r , =ψ  since u( ) = v( ), 
 
ms




1t 1 t u( c ) u( c) ,  f o r  s o m e   , ∆ =ψ ∆  
by the homogeneity property. Since u1( ) is continuous and monotone decreasing, it 




11 t 11 t u (u (c )) u (u ( c )).


















c( 1) cy i ,
c( 1) cyi
c( ( 1 ) ) y i
1
c( y i )





µψ + −µ = −




Thus we identify 
  11
11
1 , and 1- =
(( 1 ) ) (( 1 ) ) ∆∆
ϕ= − ϕ
µψ + −µ µψ + −µ
. ■ 
 
 